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Many argue that minimum wages can prevent efficiency losses from monopsony power. We assess this argument in a general equilibrium model of oligopsonistic labor markets with heterogeneous workers and firms. We decompose welfare gains into anefficiencycomponent that captures reductions in monopsony power and aredistributivecomponent that captures the way minimum wages shift resources across people. The minimum wage that maximizes the efficiency component of welfare lies below $8.00 and yields gains worth less than 0.2% of lifetime consumption. When we add back in Utilitarian redistributive motives, the optimal minimum wage is $11 and redistribution accounts for 102.5% of the resulting welfare gains, implying offsetting efficiency losses of −2.5%. The reason a minimum wage struggles to deliver efficiency gains is that with realistic firm productivity dispersion, a minimum wage that eliminates monopsony power at one firm causes severe rationing at another. These results hold under an EITC and progressive labor income taxes calibrated to the U.S. economy. 

Progressive income taxes distort hiring and wages when firms have labor market power. We characterize this novel monopsony cost of progressivity in a simple monopsony economy and derive efficiency wedges that depend on progressivity. A simple quantification of these wedges points to the possibility that the monopsony cost may be of similar magnitudes to redistribution and insurance benefits. 

We develop, estimate, and test a tractable general equilibrium model of oligopsony with differentiated jobs and concentrated labor markets. We estimate key model parameters by matching new evidence on the relationship between firms’ local labor market share and their employment and wage responses to state corporate tax changes. The model quantitatively replicates quasi-experimental evidence on imperfect productivity-wage pass-through and strategic wage setting of dominant employers. Relative to the efficient allocation, welfare losses from labor market power are 7.6 percent, while output is 20.9 percent lower. Lastly, declining local concentration added 4 percentage points to labor’s share of income between 1977 and 2013. (JEL E25, H71, J24, J31, J42, R23)